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Neil	Van	Leeuwen1	Georgia	State	University	University	of	Antwerp	University	of	Johannesburg			Abstract:	We	argue	that	many	intuitions	do	not	have	conscious	propositional	contents.	In	particular,	many	of	the	intuitions	had	in	response	to	philosophical	thought	experiments,	like	Gettier	cases,	do	not	have	such	contents.	They	are	more	like	hunches,	urgings,	murky	feelings,	and	twinges.	Our	view	thus	goes	against	the	received	view	of	intuitions	in	philosophy,	which	we	call	Mainstream	Propositionalism.	Our	positive	view	is	that	many	thought-experimental	intuitions	are	conscious,	spontaneous,	non-theoretical,	non-propositional	psychological	states	that	often	motivate	belief	revision,	but	they	require	interpretation,	in	light	of	background	beliefs,	before	a	subject	can	form	a	propositional	judgment	as	a	consequence	of	them.	We	call	our	view	Interpretationalism.	We	argue	(i)	that	Interpretationalism	avoids	the	problems	that	beset	Mainstream	Propositionalism	and	(ii)	that	our	view	meshes	well	with	empirical	results	in	contemporary	cognitive	science.				
1	Introduction:	Interpretationalism	versus	Mainstream	Propositionalism		Philosophers	tend	to	talk	about	intuitions	as	though	they	have	propositional	contents,	as	in,	“I	have	an	intuition	that	p!”	But	we	should	be	wary	of	such	talk.	Sentences	used	to	describe	mental	states	often	mislead	in	one	way	or	another.	One	tells	a	waiter,	“I	want	the	roasted	Brussels	sprouts,”	when	one’s	desire	is	really	just	for	hot	vegetables.	Or	one	says,	“I	knew	that	she	would	go	back	on	her	promise!”	when	one	only	really	had	a	murky	suspicion.	It’s	a	mistake	to	confuse	the	nature	of	a	psychological	state	with	the	content	of	a	sentence	we	happen	to	use	in	attempting	to	describe	it.	This	is	a	familiar	point	in	philosophy	of	mind.2	
																																																								1	Authorship	is	divided	equally.	2	Lewis	(1983)	and	Dennett	(1987)	both	make	this	point.	
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	 We	think	talking	about	intuitions	as	though	they	have	propositional	contents	is	also	misleading.	When	reporting	intuitions	in	response	to	thought	experiments,	philosophers	often	use	that	clauses.	“My	intuition	is	that	Smith’s	belief	is	justified	and	
true	but	not	knowledge.”	“My	intuition	is	that	it	is	wrong	to	push	the	man	off	the	
bridge.”	Or,	“My	intuition	is	that	there	is	no	understanding	of	Chinese	in	the	room.”	But	such	talk	creates	a	misleading	impression.	The	misleading	impression	is	that	intuitions	always	have	determinate,	consciously-accessible	propositional	contents.		We	call	this	standard,	widely-shared	view	about	intuitions	Mainstream	
Propositionalism	and	summarize	it	as	follows.		
Mainstream	Propositionalism:	the	view	that	intuitions	had	spontaneously	in	response	to	philosophical	thought	experiments	always	have	determinate,	consciously-accessible	propositional	contents.			 Much	of	this	paper	(our	negative	project)	argues	that	Mainstream	Propositionalism	is	false.	Many	intuitions	prompted	by	thought	experiments	(henceforth,	thought-experimental	intuitions)	are	not	propositional.	But	if	those	intuitions	are	not	propositional,	what	are	they	like?	And	how	are	they	incorporated	into	philosophical	theory	construction?	We	argue	(our	positive	project)	they	are	more	like	hunches,	twinges,	internal	promptings,	urgings,	or	vague	suspicions	that	need	to	be	interpreted	before	their	significance	for	thought	experiments	and	related	philosophical	theses	is	apparent.	Our	view	is	Interpretationalism.			
Interpretationalism:	the	view	that	many	intuitions	had	in	response	to	philosophical	thought	experiments	must	be	interpreted	in	light	of	background	beliefs	before	the	intuiter	can	judge	what	proposition	they	support.			We	thus	hold	there	are	two	stages	on	the	route	from	intuition	to	propositional	judgment.	First,	the	person	reading	or	hearing	a	thought	experiment	has	an	unarticulated,	conscious	prompting	that	suggests	something	is	or	is	not	quite	right	about	a	philosophical	position	in	relation	to	a	thought-experimental	case;	this	prompting	is	an	intuition.	Second,	the	person	having	that	intuition,	by	thinking	in	light	of	background	beliefs,	comes	to	a	propositionally	articulated	judgment3	about	what	exactly	is	right	or	wrong	about	the	philosophical	position	or	vignette	under	consideration.	Mainstream	Propositionalism—this	is	its	great	demerit—conflates	the	intuition	of	the	first	stage	with	the	judgment	of	the	second.		 Here’s	a	preview	of	the	paper.	Section	2	shows	how	Mainstream	Propositionalism	breaks	down	into	four	distinct,	widely-endorsed	claims,	where	three	of	them	(with	some	modification)	turn	out	to	be	still	correct	on	our	theory.																																																									3	We’re	using	“judgment”	here	as	a	catchall	term	for	what	could	really	be	a	variety	of	conscious	cognitive	attitudes,	not	just	conscious	beliefs.	For	example,	the	output	of	the	interpretive	process	might	be	a	conscious	hypothesis	or	working	assumption.	Those	differences	won’t	make	a	difference,	however,	to	the	main	arguments	of	this	paper.	
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This	overlap	gives	us	confidence	that	we	have	many	of	the	same	mental	states	in	mind	under	the	term	“intuition”	as	people	who	hold	Mainstream	Propositionalism;	so	our	dispute	is	not	merely	terminological.	Section	3	executes	our	negative	project,	giving	three	arguments	against	Mainstream	Propositionalism:	one	phenomenological;	a	second	from	divergences	over	how	intuitions	are	reported	and	described;	and	a	third	from	unification	with	the	psychology	of	linguistic	intuitions	about	fictional	sentences.	Section	4	presents	Interpretationalism,	a	theory	about	what	non-propositional	intuitions	are,	where	they	come	from,	and	how	philosophers	in	fact	(often	contrary	to	their	metaphilosophical	musings)	deploy	them.	Section	5	concludes	with	reflections	on	the	significance	of	our	claims	for	philosophical	method.	
	 What	is	the	scope	of	our	project?	That	is,	of	all	the	mental	states	that	could	be	called	“intuitions,”	which	ones	are	we	talking	about?	As	Nado	(2014)	argues,	the	class	of	mental	states	called	“intuition”	is	heterogeneous.	So	it’s	folly	to	generalize	too	broadly.	We	deal	with	this	issue	as	follows.	First,	we	restrict	the	scope	of	our	theory	to	mental	states	had	spontaneously	in	response	to	philosophical	thought	experiments,	such	as	Gettier	cases,	which	we	treat	here	as	paradigmatic	of	thought	experiments.	We	use	intuition	types	from	other	parts	of	psychology	mainly	for	comparison	and	illustration,	and	we	set	many	intuitions	aside	for	now,	such	as	mathematical	intuitions.	Second,	even	with	this	restriction,	we	acknowledge	that	
some	thought-experimental	mental	states	plausibly	called	“intuitions”	might	not	fit	our	theory.	Accordingly,	we	present	Interpretationalism	as	a	theory	of	many	(perhaps	the	majority)	of	the	intuitions	people	have	in	response	to	thought	experiments.	It	is	an	enlarged	existential	claim,	not	a	universal	one.	This	gives	us	a	dialectical	advantage	over	someone	who	would	defend	Mainstream	Propositionalism,	who	must	claim	all	thought-experimental	intuitions	are	propositional;	to	win	the	dispute	we	only	have	to	show	some	paradigmatic	intuitions	are	not.	Third,	we	acknowledge	that	how	broadly	our	theory	extends	is	in	the	end	an	empirical	question;	intuitions	are	psychological	states	and	psychology	is	a	matter	for	empirical	investigation.	Our	theory	applies	at	least	to	the	examples	we	discuss	here.	But	empirical	evidence	will	have	to	determine	how	often	and	when	the	cognitive	structures	we	detail	in	section	4	occur.	In	any	case,	since	there	are	many	philosophers	to	whom	it	has	not	even	occurred	that	intuitions	about	philosophical	thought	experiments	might	not	be	propositional,	our	main	contribution	is	to	put	Interpretationalism	on	the	map.				
2	Mainstream	Propositionalism		
	Four	popular	claims	conjoin	to	make	Mainstream	Propositionalism.	Each	comes	in	different	forms,	but	we	abstract	from	that	variety	in	order	to	present	evidence	that	the	four	claims	are	popular	enough	that	their	conjunction	amounts	to	being	a	standard	view.		(1) Intuitions	are	conscious.	
		 4	
Koksvik	(2011:	10)	writes,	“Having	an	intuition	makes	a	particular	contribution	to	the	character	of	the	overall	experience	of	the	person	who	is	having	it.”	Put	simply,	there	is	something	it’s	like	to	intuit.	This	what-it’s-likeness	guides	our	interactions	with	philosophical	claims	and	theories.	When	we	reflect	on	some	philosophical	claim,	our	thinking	may	be	punctuated	by	a	peculiar	phenomenology;	suddenly,	a	claim	appears	in	a	certain	light—though	we	might	not	possess	explicit,	articulable	reasons	for	why	this	should	be	so.	Or	we	experience	an	alarm-like	surge	in	phenomenology,	a	tug,	push,	or	feeling	of	attraction	or	repulsion.	Bealer	(1998:	207)	describes	intuition	as	“a	genuine	kind	of	conscious	episode”	and	calls	intuitions	“intellectual	seemings”	(208).4		(2) Intuitions	are	spontaneous.		Intuitions	“flow	spontaneously	from	the	situations	that	engender	them,	rather	than	from	any	process	of	explicit	reasoning”	(Gopnik	and	Schwitzgebel	1998:	77).	Though	consciously	entertaining	a	proposition	or	thought	experiment	may	result	in	an	intuition,	intuitions	themselves	are	not	consciously	formed.	They	are	the	conscious	product	of	a	non-conscious	process.	They	cannot	be	formed	via	conscious	inference	from	other	conscious	mental	states.	Nor	can	intuitions	be	directly	summoned	at	will,	though	they	can	be	indirectly	facilitated	by	attention	to	appropriate	stimuli	(like	Gettier	cases).	For	this	reason,	intuitions	are	“phenomenologically	basic;	their	inferential	heritage	is	not	introspectively	available”	(Kornblith	2002:	20).	As	far	as	first-person	experience	is	concerned,	intuitions	spontaneously	happen	in	the	presence	of	certain	inputs.5		(3) Intuitions	are	non-theoretical.		Imagine	that	you	are	seeing	the	Müller-Lyer	figure	for	the	first	time.			
																																																										4	The	view	that	intuitions	are	phenomenally	conscious	is	defended	by	Pollock	(1974),	Plantinga	(1993),	Bealer	(1998,	1999),	Pust	(2000),	Huemer	(2001,	2007,	2013),	Koksvik	(2011),	Chudnoff	(2011,	2013),	and	Bengson	(2015).		Goldman	and	Pust	(1998),	Goldman	(2007),	and	Ludwig	(2007)	also	intimate	adherence	to	something	like	this	claim.	Even	alleged	deniers	of	intuitive	phenomenology,	Williamson	(2007)	and	Sosa	(2007),	maintain	that	there	is	something	it	is	like	to	intuit;	however,	they	differ	from	many	of	the	above	authors	in	that	they	also	maintain	that	this	phenomenology	is	exhausted	by	what	it’s	like	to	be	consciously	inclined	to	accept	a	proposition	and	what	it’s	like	to	entertain	a	proposition,	respectively.		5	For	more	views	that	also	suggest	spontaneity,	see	Lycan	(1988),	Bealer	(1998),	Gopnik	and	Schwitzgebel	(1998),	Goldman	and	Pust	(1998),	Kornblith	(2002),	Nichols,	Stich,	and	Weinberg	(2003),	Goldman	(2007),	Bengson	(2015),	and	Taylor	(2015).	
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You	are	taken	by	the	appearance	of	a	longer	line	and	a	shorter	one;	you	even	form	the	belief	that	one	line	is	longer.	Shortly	thereafter,	you	discover	your	experience	was	an	illusion;	neither	line	is	longer	than	the	other.	A	quick	measurement	assures	you	that	your	eyes	have	deceived	you.	But	looking	again,	you	find	the	unequal	appearance	remains!	Despite	believing	otherwise,	one	line	just	seems	longer;	“the	visual	attraction	to	think	them	incongruent	remains”	(Sosa	2014:	41).		Thought-experimental	intuitions	seem	to	behave	similarly.	Like	perceptual	seemings,	intuitions	often	put	pressure	on	a	subject’s	beliefs.	And	like	perceptual	seemings,	intuitions	are	not	subject	to	revision	simply	as	the	conclusion	of	a	rational	argument.6	Otherwise	put,	intuitions	are	non-theoretical.		Bealer	(1998:	208)	illustrates	this	point,	writing,	“Just	try	to	diminish	readily		.	.	.	your	intuition	that	your	favorite	Gettier	example	could	occur.”	Intuitions,	Bealer	holds,	just	aren’t	rationally	sensitive	to	our	beliefs	and	desires.	This	claim	has	proved	hugely	influential.	Pust	(2000:	33),	for	instance,	adds	“[t]he	appearance	[in	the	Müller-Lyer	case]	.	.	.	is	impenetrable	by	belief	.	.	.	in	an	analogous	manner,	our	
intellectual	seemings	or	intuitions	can	diverge	from	our	beliefs.”		Bengson	(2015:	721-22)	unpacks	the	widely-endorsed	analogy	between	perception	and	intuition	in	a	way	that	highlights	the	intimate	connection	between	non-theoreticality	and	spontaneity.			 	.	.	.	one	is	not	free	to	manage	or	get	rid	of	[intuitions]	in	the	way	that	one	is,	or	at	least	sometimes	is,	free	to	manage	or	get	rid	of	one’s	beliefs	(e.g.	by	revisiting	or	resorting	old	evidence	or	by	seeking	new	evidence).	Similarly,	one	is	not	free	to	pick	whether,	what,	and	how	to	experience	or	intuit	in	the	way	that	one	is,	or	at	least	sometimes	is,	free	to	pick	whether,	what,	and	how	to	imagine,	guess,	hypothesize,	or	judge.	When	looking	around	at	one’s	immediate	environment,	whether	one	has	a	visual	experience,	what	the	content	of	the	experience	that	one	has	is,	or	whether	the	experience	is	clear	and	vivid,	is	not	within	one’s	conscious	control.	Likewise,	when	reflecting	on	a	putative	counterexample,	thought	experiment,	or	elementary	logical	or	mathematical	proposition,	whether	one	has	an	intuition,	what	the	content	of	the	intuition	that	one	has	is,	or	whether	the	intuition	is	clear	and	vivid,	is	not	within	one’s	conscious	control.7,	8		(4) Intuitions	are	propositional.	[This	is	the	one	we	reject.]	According	to	consensus,	intuitions	are	propositional.	Just	as	beliefs	are	beliefs	that	something	is	the	case,	intuiting	essentially	has	propositional	content.		The	view	that	intuitions	are	propositional	is	taken	for	granted.	The	principal	debate	among	theorists	of	intuition	concerns	what	exactly	intuiting	that	p	is,	without	much	reflection	on	whether	the	“that	p”	even	belongs	there.	There	is	the	doxastic																																																									6	It	may	be	that	they	are	revisable	through	a	sort	of	practice,	in	which	one	attends	to	certain	things	and	trains	oneself	in	a	certain	way.	7	Note	that	Bealer,	Pust,	and	Bengson	extend	the	claim	of	non-theoreticality	to	mathematical	intuitions,	about	which	we	reserve	judgment.	For	our	purposes,	it	is	enough	that	those	scholars	endorse	the	claim	when	it	comes	to	thought-experimental	intuitions.		8	For	more	on	non-theoreticality,	see	also	Bealer	(1998),	Sosa	(1998,	2007,	2014),	Pust	(2000),	Goldman	(2007),	Ludwig	(2007),	Williamson	(2007),	Koksvik	(2011),	Chudnoff	(2011,	2013),	and	Bengson	(2015).		
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view	that	intuiting	involves	believing,	judging,	or	being	inclined	to	believe	or	judge	that	p.	Van	Inwagen	(1997:	309),	for	example,	claims,	“[o]ur	‘intuitions’	are	simply	our	beliefs	.	.	.	”9	Then	there	is	the	sui	generis	view	according	to	which	intuition	is	a	distinct	propositional	attitude	unto	itself.	Intuition,	writes	Bealer,	is	“a	sui	generis,	irreducible	.	.	.		propositional	attitude”	(1998:	207).	For	Cullison	(2013:	33),	the	attitude	of	intuiting	is	“not	analyzable	in	terms	of	the	other	mental	phenomena.”	According	to	sui	generis	theorists,	intuition	essentially	involves	a	conscious	seeming,	presentation,	or	appearance	that	p,	in	which	a	subject	is	made	consciously	aware	of	a	proposition	in	a	way	that	is	epistemically	favorable.	Tucker	(2010:	53)	writes,“[t]he	phenomenology	of	a	seeming	makes	it	feel	as	though	the	seeming	is	‘recommending’	its	propositional	content	as	true	or	‘assuring’	us	of	the	content’s	truth.”10		In	this	debate,	advocates	of	the	doxastic	view	and	advocates	of	the	sui	generis	view,	as	noted,	mostly	take	for	granted	that	intuitions	are	always	propositional	and	that	their	propositional	contents	are	consciously	accessible.		To	us,	this	illustrates	how	fierce	debates	often	occur	between	two	parties	unreflectively	in	the	grip	of	the	same	false	dogma.	 *	 *	 *	Thus,	the	purported	properties	of	intuition	are	consciousness,	spontaneity,	
non-theoreticality,	and	propositionality.	Mainstream	Propositionalism	is	the	conjunction	of	the	four	claims	attributing	these	properties.	Importantly,	Mainstream	Propositionalists	hold	that	intuiters	are	conscious	of	a	specific	proposition,	as	the	above	quotations	confirm.	This	point	is	crucial	to	our	refutation	in	the	next	section:	intuiters,	we	hold,	are	conscious	of	something,	but	it’s	often	not	a	specific	proposition.	Be	that	as	it	may,	if	we	subtract	claim	(4)	[that	intuitions	are	propositional]	from	this	cluster,	we	get	a	triad	with	which	we	agree:	the	intuitions	we	discuss	are	spontaneous,	non-theoretical,	and	conscious	(though	their	conscious	aspect	does	not	include	consciousness	of	a	proposition).	Our	positive	view	in	section	4	accounts	for	each	of	these	properties.			
3	Our	Negative	Project:	Intuitions	Are	Not	Propositional		We	give	three	arguments	against	Mainstream	Propositionalism.	All	three	point	in	the	same	direction:	many	intuitions	do	not	have	conscious	propositional	contents.	This	section	is	not	merely	negative,	however,	since	its	observations	set	the	stage	for	our	Interpretationalist	theory.																																																										9	He	adds,	interestingly,	“or	perhaps,	in	some	cases,	the	tendencies	that	make	certain	beliefs	attractive	to	us.”	This	latter	portion	could	be	interpreted	along	our	lines.	10	For	the	view	that	intuition	is	a	propositional	attitude,	see	also	van	Inwagen	(1997),	Goldman	and	Pust	(1998),	Gopnik	and	Schwitzgbel	(1998),	Bealer	(1998.	1999),	BonJour	(1998,	2001),	Sosa	(1998,	2007,	2014),	Pust	(2000),	Huemer	(2001,	2007,	2013),	Kornblith	(2002),	Ludwig	(2007),	Tucker	(2010),	Koksvik	(2011),	Chudnoff	(2011,	2013),	Cullison	(2013),	and	Bengson	(2015).	For	the	view	that	intuiting	involves	being	aware	of	a	proposition,	see	Tolhurst	(1998),	Bealer	(1998,	1999),	BonJour	(1998,	2001),	Hales	(2000),	Pust	(2000),	Huemer	(2001,	2007,	2013),	Tucker	(2009),	Chudnoff	(2011,	2013),	Lycan	(2013),	and	Bengson	(2015).	
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3.1	A	Non-Propositional	Phenomenology		Let’s	reflect	on	our	conscious	mental	states	as	we	approach	the	critical	moment	of	Gettier’s	classic	piece.	Imagine	it’s	1963,	the	year	of	publication.	You	begin	reading	with	a	firm	conviction	that	justified	true	belief	is	knowledge.	True,	there	are	questions	about	each	of	the	three	focal	terms	in	this	standard	analysis,	but	whatever	waves	rock	the	philosophical	seas,	knowledge	and	justified	true	belief	ride	them	together.	Or	so	you	think.		 But	concern	sneaks	in	as	you	read	Gettier’s	set-up.	“First…it	is	possible	to	be	justified	in	believing	a	proposition	that	is	in	fact	false”	(121).	“Secondly…if	S	is	justified	in	believing	P,	and	P	entails	Q,	and	S	deduces	Q	from	P…then	S	is	justified	in	believing	Q”	(121).	These	points	both	feel	familiar.	But	seeing	them	together,	so	simply	put,	is	strangely	unsettling.		 Now	comes	the	hammer.			 	.	.	.	suppose	that	Smith	has	strong	evidence	for	the	following	conjunctive	proposition.		 (d)	Jones	is	the	man	who	will	get	the	job,	and	Jones	has	ten	coins	in	his	pocket.				.	.	.	Proposition	(d)	entails:		 (e)	The	man	who	will	get	the	job	has	ten	coins	in	his	pocket.			.	.	.	In	this	case,	Smith	is	clearly	justified	in	believing	that	(e)	is	true.		But	imagine	further	that,	unknown	to	Smith,	he	himself,	not	Jones,	will	get	the	job.	And	also	unknown	to	Smith,	he	himself	has	ten	coins	in	his	pocket.	Proposition	(e)	is	then	true,	though	proposition	(d),	from	which	Smith	inferred	(e),	is	false.	(122)		Something	is	amiss.	You	frantically	read	back	over	the	case,	just	to	make	sure	you	
understood	everything.	Yes	.	.	.	(d)	is	false,	though	justified	.	.	.	yes	.	.	.	(d)	entails	(e)	(but	
does	anyone	really	have	such	a	silly	belief	about	10	coins?	does	it	matter?	is	(e)	really	
justified)	.	.	.but		yes	.	.	.	(e)	is	true!	It	appears	that	the	conditions	of	justified	true	belief	are	satisfied,	though	you	have	a	lingering	suspicion	that	maybe	they	aren’t	really.	And	importantly,	when	you	think	of	using	“knowledge”	to	refer	to	Smith’s	belief	(e),	it	feels	off.	That	mental	state—the	something-feels-very-wrong	internal	feeling—is,	on	our	view,	the	intuition.			 Let’s	call	this	state	“SFVW,”	for	“something	feels	very	wrong.”	In	identifying	SFVW	with	the	Gettier	intuition,	we	mean	something	specific.	SFVW	comes	
spontaneously	in	response	to	learning	details	of	the	Gettier	case;	it	also	appears	independently	of	your	background	theory	(it	even	feels	contrary	to	it),	so	it	is	non-
theoretical;	SFVW	also	appears	consciously.	Finally,	and	importantly,	SFVW	gets	you	started	on	theory	revision:	it’s	the	unpleasant	feeling	that	motivates	you	to	revise	your	earlier	views	in	a	way	that,	you	hope,	will	make	the	unpleasant	feeling	go	away.	So	SFVW	has	three	of	the	four	properties	standardly	thought	characteristic	of	
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intuitions,	and	it	is	a	starting	point	of	theorizing;	that’s	what	we	mean	when	we	call	it	“intuition.”			 But,	we	think,	SFVW	is	not	propositional.	Uneasy,	something-is-wrong	feelings	are	not	specific	enough	to	be	attributed	propositional	content,	which	is	a	
specific	meaning.	What	would	its	proposition	be?	Is	it	that	knowledge	is	not	justified	
true	belief?	Is	it	that	(e)	wasn’t	really	justified?	Is	it	that	Smith	just	doesn’t	know?	Is	it	
that	a	fourth	condition	is	needed	in	the	analysis?	All	of	these	possibilities	(and	maybe	more)	lurk	in	your	mind	in	the	moment	after	you	have	SFVW	and	before	you	revise	your	theory	in	a	way	you	decide	is	right,	which	is	an	open-endedness	you	would	not	expect	if	the	intuition	had	a	clear,	consciously-accessible	propositional	content.			 SFVW	has	motivational	force,	pushing	for	you	to	look	for	a	theoretical	move	that	will	alleviate	the	very	wrong	sense.	After	reflecting	on	your	options,	you	judge,	reluctantly,	that	Smith’s	belief	(e)	is	not	knowledge.	But	that	judgment	is	not	the	spontaneous	intuition,	it	is	a	product,	in	part,	of	the	background	beliefs	you	have	that	delineate	the	space	of	theoretical	options	before	you.	That	is,	your	judgment	is	the	product	of	interpreting	the	significance	of	SFVW,	in	light	of	your	background	beliefs.	We	might	talk	as	if	the	intuition	has	the	content	that	Smith’s	belief	is	not	
knowledge,	but	this	loose	talk	conflates	the	intuition	with	its	related	follow-on	judgment.	Follow-on	judgments	often	happen	very	quickly	after	intuitions,	but	they	are	still	distinct.		 Similar	observations	emerge	from	reflection	on	any	number	of	thought	experiments.	Searle’s	(1980)	“Chinese	Room”	elicits	a	sense	of	something’s	being	missing,	but	it’s	not	clear	whether	something	is	missing	from	the	Chinese	room	or	something	is	missing	from	our	understanding	of	what	occurs	in	it	(Dennett	2013).	Block’s	(1978)	nation	of	China,	Parfit’s	(1984)	splitting	cases,	and	many	others	will,	on	phenomenological	reflection,	yield	similar	results:	the	spontaneous,	conscious	intuition	doesn’t	determine	a	precise	proposition.	Even	further	reflection	may	leave	the	intuition’s	significance	unstable,	oscillating	until	our	related	beliefs	stabilize	as	well.		 To	summarize	these	points	as	sharply	as	possible,	we	assert	the	following.	
Many	thought-experimental	intuitions	are	positively	or	negatively	valenced	
spontaneous,	conscious,	non-theoretical	feelings	that	are	directed	at	a	cluster	of	ideas	
(broadly	construed)	and	that	motivate	revising	or	maintaining	beliefs	one	has	about	
those	ideas.	A	judgment,	by	way	of	contrast,	is	a	conscious	event	in	which	a	new	belief	is	formed.		
3.2	Same	Intuition,	Varying	Verbal	Expression	
	Now	we	face	a	fascinating	puzzle.	Experimental	evidence	is	converging	to	show	that	there	is	a	common	intuition	type	among	normal	humans—across	cultures,	among	“experts”	and	non-experts—in	response	to	Gettier	cases.	There	is,	however,	substantial	variation	in	what	people	say	about	their	Gettier	intuitions.	Philosophers,	thinking	Gettier	intuitions	have	propositional	content,	say	divergent	things	about	that	supposed	content.	And	if	you	survey	lay	people	about	Gettier	cases,	whether	or	not	they	say	the	Gettiered	agent	“knows”	is	sensitive	to	other	response	choices	offered	in	the	survey	(Cullen	2010).	This	is	puzzling:	if	the	Gettier	intuition	is	
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common	across	people	who	read	or	hear	Gettier	cases,	why	are	things	people	say	in	reporting	that	intuition	so	various	and	divergent?	We	offer	a	solution	to	this	puzzle.	We	agree	with	Machery	et	al.	(2015)	that	there	is,	in	human	minds	generally,	a	“universal	core	folk	epistemology,”	and	we	think	this	core	folk	epistemology	produces,	in	response	to	Gettier	cases,	tokens	of	a	common	intuition	type.	But,	we	maintain,	intuitions	of	that	type—Gettier	intuitions—do	not	have	consciously-accessible	propositional	content.	The	commonality	of	the	intuition	type	explains	why	experimental	results	converge	to	the	extent	they	do;	but	the	fact	that	Gettier	intuitions	do	not	have	consciously-accessible	propositional	content	explains	why	people’s	expressions	of	those	intuitions	are	so	various:	in	grasping	for	verbal	options	to	report	Gettier	intuitions,	people	come	up	with	various	things,	since	there	is	no	conscious	proposition	affixed	to	the	intuition	to	nail	down	what	the	verbal	choice	should	be.		Here’s	the	plan	for	this	section	(3.2).	Step	1:	we	review	evidence	that	there	is	a	universal	core	folk	epistemology.	Step	2:	we	show	how	varied	verbal	reports	of	Gettier	intuitions	can	be.	Step	3:	we	say	why	our	anti-propositionalist	explanation	of	these	data	is	better	than	Mainstream	Propositionalism.		
Step	1.	Two	questions	are	important.	Do	people	across	cultures	respond	to	Gettier	cases	in	similar	ways?	Do	trained	philosophers	and	lay	people	respond	to	Gettier	cases	in	similar	ways?	If	the	answer	to	both	is	“yes,”	then	it	is	fair	to	infer	that	normal	humans	generally	have	intuitions	of	a	common	type	in	response	to	Gettier	cases.	Both	questions	elicit	controversy.	Weinberg	et	al.	(2001)	famously	claim	that	people	from	different	cultures	respond	differently	to	Gettier	cases,	and	Starmans	and	Friedman	(2012)	argue	empirically	that	lay	people	differ	from	philosophers	in	their	Gettier	responses.	However,	the	differences	found	by	Weinberg	et	al.	(i)	aren’t	large	and	(ii)	are	contradicted	by	more	recent,	careful	research.	And	the	differences	found	by	Starmans	and	Friedman	(2012),	while	interesting,	betray	deeper	similarities.		The	case	for	commonality	is	clearer.	Nagel	et	al.	(2013a)	tested	lay	subjects	with	a	range	of	Gettier	cases	and	found	they	were	significantly	less	likely	to	attribute	knowledge	to	Gettiered	agents11	than	to	agents	in	matched	True	Belief	cases,	just	as	philosophers	do.	And	in	their	response	to	Starmans	and	Friedman	(2013),	who	criticize	their	work,	Nagel	et	al.	(2013b:	666)	point	out,	“we	all	agree	on	a	core	point:	both	philosophers	and	laypeople	take	some	Gettier	cases	to	exemplify	justified	true	belief	without	knowledge.”	And	this	is	true:	Starmans	and	Friedman	(2012)	did	find	that	lay	people	denied	knowledge	to	Gettier	agents	who	had	been	duped	by	“apparent	evidence.”	Thus,	the	controversy	boils	down	to	whether	the	overlap	between	lay	responses	and	philosopher	responses	to	Gettier	cases	is	partial	or	total.	The	overlap	is	impressive	in	any	case.	A	plausible	construal	of	the	evidence	thus	far,	then,	is	that	lay	people	and	philosophers	start	from	a	common	core	folk	epistemology,	and	if	there	are	differences	in	responses,	this	is	because	philosophical	training	makes	adjustments	to	a	common	folk	epistemological	system.																																																										11	By	“Gettiered	agent,”	we	mean	a	character	whose	belief	seems	to	count	as	justified	and	true,	without	seeming	to	count	as	knowledge.	“Gettier	cases”	are	situations	described	in	vignettes,	in	which	Gettiered	agents	and	their	beliefs	are	prominently	featured.	
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Machery	et	al.	(2015),	furthermore,	survey	individuals	from	several	cultures	(Brazil,	India,	Japan,	and	the	USA)	and	find	that	responses	to	Gettier	and	other	cases	are	similar	across	cultures.	They	present	many	subjects—245	in	the	final	sample—with	four	cases:	two	Gettier-type	cases,	one	case	of	clear	knowledge,	and	one	false	belief	case.	The	main	dependent	variables	were	responses	to	two	knowledge	probes.	Their	Knowledge	1	probe	has	the	choices:	“Yes,	[s]he	knows”	and	“No,	[s]he	doesn’t	know”	(p.	5).	Their	Knowledge	2	probe	has	choices:	“[Protagonist]	knows	that	[relevant	proposition],”	and	“[Protagonist]	feels	like	[s]he	knows	that	[relevant	proposition]	but	[s]he	doesn’t	actually	know	[this]”	(p.	5).12	Two	striking	patterns	emerge.	First,	across	cultures,	subjects	deny	knowledge	in	both	probes	significantly	more	to	Gettiered	agents	than	to	agents	in	the	clear	knowledge	case	(effect	sizes	are	substantial).	Second,	in	response	to	the	Knowledge	2	probe,	rates	of	denial	of	knowledge	across	cultures	are	more	similar	between	the	Gettier	cases	and	the	False	Belief	case	than	between	the	Gettier	cases	and	the	Clear	Knowledge	case.	The	question	then	is	this:	why	would	people	in	such	different	cultures	respond	to	bizarre	and	unfamiliar	Gettier	cases	in	more	or	less	the	same	way?	Machery	et	al.	give	a	compelling	answer:	there	is	a	universal	core	folk	epistemology	among	humans	(see	section	4	for	how	this	idea	might	be	expanded	upon).		If	Machery	et	al.	are	right—we	think	they	are	at	least	close—it	is	natural	to	think	that	Gettier	cases	elicit	intuitions	of	the	same	type13	across	the	majority	of	people	who	encounter	those	cases;	these	are	intuitions	that	emerge	from	the	core	folk	epistemology.	In	sum,	the	commonality	of	Gettier	intuitions	across	lay	people	and	philosophers,	as	well	as	across	different	cultures,	explains	why	the	tendency	to	deny	knowledge	to	Gettiered	agents	is	so	widespread.		
Step	2.	Despite	this	commonality,	there	is	still	substantial	variation	in	what	people	say	in	response	to	Gettier	cases,	in	surveys	and	otherwise.	Three	kinds	of	divergence	stand	out.	First,	Nagel	et	al.	(2013a)	observe	that	subjects	who	score	lower	on	measures	of	empathy	are	less	likely	to	indicate	that	Gettiered	agents	are	justified.	But	many	philosophers	think	that	a	verdict	to	the	effect	that	the	Gettiered	agent	is	justified	is	part	of	the	Gettier	intuition.	So	if	we	were	to	ask,	“is	it	part	of	the	Gettier	intuition	that	Gettiered	agents	are	justified?”	we	would	get	divergent	answers.	Some	would	say	“yes;”	some	“no.”	Furthermore,	in	informal	discussion	with	other	philosophers,	we	have	noticed	that	some	characterize	the	intuition	as	being	partly	about	justification,	while	others	only	think	it	delivers	a	verdict	on	whether	the	Gettiered	agent	knows,	which	would	leave	the	question	of	justification	open.	So	people’s	reports	(in	surveys	and	otherwise)	diverge	in	terms	of	whether	they	suggest	Gettier	intuitions	have	justification	as	part	of	their	subject	matter	or	not.																																																									12	The	purpose	of	the	Knowledge	2	probe	is	to	address	the	possibility	that	some	subjects	might	read	the	Knowledge	1	probe	as	asking	about	felt	knowledge	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	agent	in	the	vignette,	as	opposed	to	asking	about	knowledge	itself.	13	When	we	say	there	are	intuitions	of	the	same	type,	we	assume	that	intuitions	can	be	classified	by	their	etiological,	phenomenological,	and	dispositional	profiles	and	that	to	be	of	the	same	type	is	to	belong	to	the	same	class	so	characterized.	Obviously,	we	think	it	is	a	mistake	to	type	intuitions	according	to	their	purported	propositional	content,	as	many	philosophers	would	be	inclined	to	do,	since	we	don’t	think	intuitions	have	such	content.	
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Second,	Cullen	(2010),	in	another	empirical	study,	finds	that	the	proportion	of	subjects	who	say	the	Gettiered	agent	“knows”	is	sensitive	to	whether	the	other	option	on	the	survey	is	“only	believes”	or	is	simply	“doesn’t	know.”	Subjects	presented	with	[knows	vs.	doesn’t	know]	are	more	likely	to	pick	knows	for	Gettiered	agents	than	subjects	presented	with	[knows	vs.	only	believes].	Somehow,	having	only	
believes	as	an	option	attracts	people	away	from	knows.	This,	in	our	view,	is	probably	because	subjects	are	reluctant	to	deny	epistemic	credentials	to	Gettiered	agents	altogether,	so	they	are	more	likely	to	pick	knows	when	the	only	other	option	seems	to	deny	those	agents	epistemic	credentials	entirely;	having	only	believes	as	an	option	alleviates	that	pressure.	Be	that	as	it	may,	it	is	striking	that	context	can	cause	people’s	responses	to	diverge	even	on	the	focal	issue	of	knowledge.		 Third,	published	metaphilosophy,	which	assumes	Gettier	intuitions	have	propositional	content,	has	divergent	accounts	of	what	that	content	is.	Williamson	(2005:	5)	accords	Gettier	intuitions	counterfactually-structured	content,	of	the	form:	“if	someone	had	stood	as	described	to	a	proposition,	then	whoever	stood	as	described	to	a	proposition	would	have	had	justified	true	belief	without	knowledge	in	respect	of	that	proposition.”	Malmgren	(2011:	281),	responding	to	Williamson,	argues	instead	that	the	content	of	Gettier	intuitions	is	a	modal	proposition	of	
possibility,	which	could	be	expressed,	“It	is	possible	that	someone	stands	to	p	as	in	the	Gettier	case	(as	described)	and	that	she	has	a	justified	true	belief	that	p	but	does	not	know	that	p.”	And	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	(2009)	issue	still	another	view.	They	claim	that	the	content	of	the	Gettier	intuition	is	a	proposition	of	necessity,	roughly	(see	their	paper	for	details):	necessarily,	if	the	Gettier	vignette	is	completely	true,	then	
someone	has	a	justified	true	belief	but	not	knowledge.	What	can	we	conclude	from	all	this?	All	three	accounts	are	similar	enough	in	spirit	that	they	must	be	talking	about	the	same	intuition	type.	But	they	posit	radically	different	propositional	structures	as	the	content	of	the	intuition.	Let	us	note	one	further	thing:	all	of	these	philosophers	engage	in	a	substantial	amount	of	reasoning	to	figure	out	what	the	content	of	the	Gettier	intuition	is	supposed	to	be;	it	is	not	as	though	the	content	is	simply	there	to	be	read	off.			 Step	3.	If	Mainstream	Propositionalism	were	right,	all	of	this	variation	would	be	strange.	According	to	that	view,	a	person	with	an	intuition	is	thereby	consciously	aware	of	some	proposition	(call	it	q):	anyone	with	the	same	intuition	is	consciously	aware	of	the	same	proposition,	q,	and	this	awareness	is	immediate	(not	reasoned	toward),	since	intuitions	are	spontaneous.	Thus,	Mainstream	Propositionalism	suggests	that	people	shouldn’t	have	to	think	much	about	what	the	(supposed)	contents	of	their	intuitions	in	fact	are,	and	people	with	the	same	intuitions	should	be	able	to	agree	on	what	the	contents	of	those	intuitions	are	supposed	to	be.	But	even	philosophers	have	to	think	a	lot	about	what	the	supposed	proposition	of	an	intuition	might	be,	and	often	they	disagree	about	it.	Why	should	they	have	to	work	so	hard	to	figure	out	a	proposition	of	which	they	are	supposed	to	be	immediately	aware?		It	is	strange,	from	the	perspective	of	Mainstream	Propositionalism,	that	different	philosophers	characterize	the	contents	of	an	apparently	common	intuition	type	so	differently.	If	they	all	consciously	intuit	that	q,	why	can’t	they	agree	on	what	q	is?	Furthermore,	the	contents	posited	by	Williamson,	Malmgren,	and	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	are	all	rather	baroque.	Given	that	lay	people	have	the	same	Gettier	intuitions	
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as	philosophers,	are	we	to	say	that	lay	people	are	consciously	aware	of	propositions	as	complex	as	those	described	by	the	philosophers	in	question?	In	addition,	the	variation	that	Nagel	et	al.	observe	in	whether	people	think	Gettier	beliefs	are	justified	puts	more	pressure	on	Mainstream	Propositionalism.	Does	q	include	something	about	justification,	or	not?	Finally,	the	sensitivity	to	alternate	options	on	surveys,	which	Cullen	observe,	is	puzzling	for	Mainstream	Propositionalism,	since	that	sensitivity	appears	to	cause	people	to	give	different	responses	on	the	very	focal	issue	of	whether	the	Gettiered	agents	“know.”	Shouldn’t	q,	for	the	Mainstream	Propositionalist,	at	least	include	a	clear	verdict	on	knowledge,	of	which	the	person	having	the	intuition	would	be	conscious?			 Such	puzzles	evaporate	once	our	view	is	adopted.	For	us,	the	intuition	is	the	vague	but	strong	sense	of	something’s	being	wrong	with	the	ascription	of	knowledge	to	the	Gettiered	agents.	That’s	it;	no	proposition.	The	commonality	of	this	sense/intuition	across	people	who	have	core	folk	epistemology	(most	people)	accounts	for	the	convergence	in	the	experimental	results	that	show	people	tend	to	deny	Gettiered	agents	have	knowledge:	if	something	feels	wrong	about	ascribing	knowledge,	it’s	natural	to	deny	knowledge.	But	since	the	Gettier	intuition	doesn’t	have	propositional	structure,	it	doesn’t	include	a	clear	verdict	on	questions	like:	is	the	Gettiered	agent’s	belief	justified?	The	lack	of	such	verdicts	explains	the	variation	in	observed	Gettier	reports,	both	among	philosophers	and	lay	people.	The	one	thing	that	seems	difficult	for	our	account	to	explain	is	that	philosophers	seem	so	convinced	that	intuitions,	including	Gettier	intuitions,	are	propositional.	How	could	such	intelligent	people	be	so	misled?	But	this	is	in	fact	no	surprise	for	us.	Appeal	to	propositional	attitudes	is	so	pervasive	in	philosophy—the	approach	often	works—that	we	expect	it	to	be	unreflectively	overextended	in	certain	domains.	In	fact,	if	you	combine	our	view	that	intuitions	are	not	propositional	with	the	fact	that	philosophers	have	the	false	impression	that	they	are,	it	is	easy	to	explain	why	philosophers	say	intuitions	have	propositional	content	but	then	can’t	agree	what	that	content	is.	In	so	saying,	they	just	voice	antecedent	conviction;	in	not	agreeing	with	one	another,	they	accidentally	reveal	that	that	conviction	is	false.				 Let’s	deal	briefly	with	two	apparent	objections	to	the	argument	of	this	section.	First	objection:	one	might	say	that	thought-experimental	intuitions	have	propositional	content,	but	that	the	intuiters	are	not	conscious	of	that	content.	Though	we	find	it	dubious,	we	respond	by	taking	no	stand	on	this	possible	view,	since	our	focus	is	on	refuting	Mainstream	Propositionalism,	which	does	imply	consciousness	of	a	proposition.	But	we	add	that	even	if	intuitions	did	have	non-conscious	propositional	content,	much	of	what	we	say	in	sections	4	and	5	about	the	need	for	intuitions	to	be	interpreted	would	still	be	true:	since	an	intuition’s	conscious	component	would	not	be	propositional,	one	would	still	need	to	engage	in	interpretation	of	that	conscious	component	to	figure	out	what	the	mooted	non-conscious	content	is.	Second	objection:	one	might	maintain	that	one	can	explain	the	data	reviewed	in	this	section	by	saying	that	the	Gettier	intuition’s	conscious	content	is	simply	that	x’s	belief	is	not	knowledge	(where	x	is	the	Gettiered	agent).14	We	respond	to	this	suggestion	in	three	ways.	(i)	The	suggestion	will	have	a	hard	time																																																									14	Something	like	this	would	be	the	view	of	Goldman	and	Pust	(1998).	
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with	Cullen’s	finding	that	people	are	less	likely	to	deny	knowledge,	given	certain	options	as	opposed	to	others	in	a	forced-choice	paradigm.	If	the	intuition	were	just	a	conscious	denial	of	knowledge,	we	wouldn’t	expect	such	variability	due	to	pragmatic	features	of	survey	design.	(ii)	If	the	Gettier	intuition	has	that	content	and	only	that	content,	it	is	puzzling	that	philosophers	disagree	so	much	about	the	exact	content	of	the	intuition.	If	one	has	proposition	q	as	a	part	of	a	conscious	mental	state,	one	should	be	able	to	agree	with	others	who	have	that	same	mental	state	about	what	the	constituents	of	q	in	fact	are.	Our	view	faces	neither	problem	(i)	nor	(ii).	Our	response	number	(iii)	comes	at	the	end	of	the	next	section	(3.3).	
	
3.3	Comparison	with	Linguistic	Intuitions	about	Fiction		Though	our	focus	is	on	thought-experimental	intuitions,	it	is	worth	asking	whether	similar	things	can	be	said	about	other	intuition	types.	The	brain	often	uses	the	same	psychological	structures	for	various	purposes.	So	if	intuitions	of	a	certain	form—spontaneous,	conscious,	non-theoretical,	and	non-propositional—are	found	to	occur	outside	thought-experimental	mental	processes,	that	fact	increases	the	likelihood	that	intuitions	of	that	form	occur	inside	thought-experimental	processes	too.15			 Here	we	argue	that	linguistic	intuitions	about	fictional	sentences	are	non-propositional.	Consider	this	as	one	step	in	a	larger	exploration	of	the	terrain	of	non-propositional	intuitions.		 Consider	two	sentences	about	Hermione	Granger,	the	clever	wizard-in-training	at	Hogwarts:		 (HG1)	Hermione	can	cast	spells.	(HG2)	Hermione	has	42	fingers.		If	you	know	even	a	bit	about	Harry	Potter,	you	probably	just	had	intuitions.	HG1	seems	right	(in	some	way),	and	HG2	seems	wrong	(in	some	way).	Let’s	call	the	intuition	types	had	in	response	to	these	sentences	I1	and	I2,	respectively.	It’s	highly	likely	that,	as	psychological	kinds,	I1	and	I2	have	roughly	the	same	characteristics	across	speakers	of	English	who	are	familiar	with	Harry	Potter:	the	language	is	common	(English);	the	stories	are	familiar;	the	capacity	to	process	fiction	is	a	general	human	trait;	so	intuitions	in	response	to	sentences	describing	familiar	figures,	like	Hermione,	shouldn’t	differ	much	from	person	to	person.	I1	is	a	sort	of	internal,	conscious	uh-huh;	I2	is	an	internal,	conscious	nuh-uh.		 Now,	toward	reductio,	let’s	assume	that	Propositionalism-f	(that	is,	Mainstream	Propositionalism	suitably	modified	to	be	about	intuitions	about	fictional	discourse)	is	true	of	I1	and	I2:	people	who	have	I1,	on	this	view,	are	
conscious	of	a	proposition,	as	are	people	who	have	I2.	If	this	is	correct,	people	should	
report	their	tokenings	of	I1	and	I2	using	equivalent	or	at	least	almost	equivalent	propositional	complements;	at	the	very	least,	their	reports	should	be	consistent	with																																																									15	To	make	a	similar	point,	it	is	scientifically	desirable	to	unify	theories	as	much	as	possible	(Friedman	1974),	so	unifying	thought-experimental	intuitions	with	others—provided	it	seems	empirically	reasonable—should	count	in	favor	of	any	theory	of	intuition.	
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one	another.	If	one	English	speaker	reports	I1	as	that	p,	another	should	report	a	similar	content	or	at	least	a	content	that	coheres	with	p.	But	this	is	not	what	we	are	likely	to	find.16	One	person	will	say,	“HG1	is	true.	She	can	cast	spells.”	But	another	will	say,	“Yeah,	I	know	HG1	isn’t	true	because	it’s	fiction,	but	it	gets	things	right.”	Both	speakers	are	trying	to	report	the	same	“uh-huh”	intuition	to	HG1.	But	they	differ	in	what	they	say	due	to	different	background	views	about	whether	fictional	sentences	can	be	true.	The	two	speakers	in	fact	contradict	one	another,	despite	reporting	the	same	“uh-huh”	intuition.	The	first	speaker	says	HG1	is	true,	while	the	second	says	it’s	not	true	(though	still	somehow	right).	So	not	only	is	the	same	intuition	type	(“uh-huh”)	reported	in	ways	that	are	non-equivalent;	it	is	even	reported	in	ways	that	contradict.	This,	we	think,	would	not	happen	if	tokenings	of	I1	came	with	conscious	propositional	content.	So	Propositionalism-f	is	not	true	of	I1	after	all;	a	parallel	argument	can	be	run	for	I2.	But	I1	and	I2	are	conscious,	spontaneous,	and	non-theoretical	(check	your	phenomenology),	so	the	thing	to	reject	is	the	element	of	Propositionalism-f	that	says	I1	and	I2	are	propositional.	This	argument	generalizes	to	most	intuitions	about	fictional	sentences.			 The	argument	just	given	puts	defenders	of	Propositionalism-f	on	their	heels.	They	might	say	that	I1	simply	has	the	content	that	HG1	is	true	and	I2	the	content	
that	HG2	is	false;	they	would	then	claim	that	people	who	say	otherwise	are	just	letting	their	verbal	reports	of	an	otherwise	clear	intuition	be	obfuscated	by	a	pet	theory	of	fictional	semantics.	But	this	response	is	straining.	A	speaker	who	says	“I	know	HG1	isn’t	true	.	.	.	”	is	unlikely	to	have	had	a	conscious	intuition	that	HG1	is	true:	when	this	speaker	verbalizes	that	HG1	is	not	true,	she	does	not	take	herself	to	be	saying	something	that	contradicts	a	consciously	intuited	proposition.	Rather,	her	saying	“Yeah,	I	know	HG1	isn’t	true	because	it’s	fiction,	but	it	gets	things	right”	is	a	fumbling	attempt	at	expressing	that	something	feels	right	about	HG1.				 This	murkiness	about	what	to	say	about	fictional	sentences	infects	the	philosophical	literature	on	fiction	as	well.	And	it	does	so	in	a	way	that	further	suggests	that	intuitions	like	I1	and	I2	don’t	come	with	conscious	propositional	contents.	There	is,	as	one	would	expect,	widespread	agreement	that	sentences	along	the	lines	of	HG1	are	in	some	way	correct	and	that	sentences	along	the	lines	of	HG2	are	in	some	way	not.	But	in	what	ways	are	they	“correct”	or	“incorrect”?	Here	the	consensus	stops.	Lewis	(1978)	regards	sentences	like	“Sherlock	Holmes	lived	in	Baker	Street”	as	true	and	having	an	implicit	“In	fiction	f	.	.	.	”	operator	(hence	his	title:	“Truth	in	Fiction”),	and	he	regards	sentences	like	“Sherlock	Holmes	has	three	nostrils”	as	false	(operator	or	no).	Accordingly,	he	gives	a	theory	of	the	meaning	of	fictional	sentences	according	to	which	they	can	come	out	as	true	or	false;	for	him,	the	contents	of	fictional	sentences	are	complex	counterfactuals.	But	Walton	(1990),	in	a	rather	different	theory,	characterizes	such	sentences	in	terms	of	fictionality,	a	term	of	art	that	does	not	mean	straightforward	truth.	HG1	would,	for	him,	count	as	
fictional,	and	HG2	would	count	as	not	fictional.	He	would	cash	this	out,	roughly,	by	saying	that	the	Harry	Potter	game	of	make-believe	prescribes	imagining	the	proposition	expressed	by	HG1,	while	it	does	not	prescribe	imagining	the	proposition																																																									16	We	grant,	of	course,	the	question	is	empirical,	but	find	it	highly	plausible	that	the	data	would	work	out	as	we	suggest.	
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HG2	expresses.	Importantly,	for	Walton,	HG1	and	HG2	both	express	literally	false	propositions,	though	one	is	fictional	and	the	other	is	not.	Taylor	(2000),	on	the	other	hand,	holds	a	view	strikingly	at	odds	with	both	Walton’s	and	Lewis’.	Taylor,	a	dyed-in-the-wool	referentialist,	holds	that	sentences	with	empty	names,	like	“Hermione,”	simply	do	not	assert	propositions,	since	a	syntactically	well-formed	sentence	still	doesn’t	give	you	a	proposition	if	some	of	its	constituents	are	empty.	Rather,	for	Taylor,	HG1	would	express	a	“proposition-in-waiting”	or	an	unsaturated	“propositional	scheme.”	For	him,	sentences	with	empty	names	can’t	be	true	or	false;	they	have	no	semantic	value	whatsoever.	Taylor	then	argues	that,	though	such	sentences	assert	nothing,	they	manage	to	be	pseudo-assertions	and	some	of	what	is	pseudo-asserted	can	be	propositional	and	true.17		 Lewis,	Walton,	and	Taylor,	as	normal	readers	of	fiction	and	normal	speakers	of	English,	presumably	have	the	same	intuitions	about	correct	or	incorrect	fictional	sentences	as	anyone	else.	These	intuitions	are	their	data	as	theorists	and	are	the	reason	they’re	not	talking	past	each	other.	But	note	that	there	is	no	exact	proposition	that	the	three	theorists	even	could	share	as	an	“intuitive”	starting	point.	Notice,	for	example,	how	cautious	and	unspecific	Taylor	is	about	what	the	intuitions	even	are:	“I	acknowledge	the	deference	due	to	the	widely	shared	intuition	that	one	who	utters	any	of	(1)-(3)	may	speak	truly,	while	one	who	utters	any	of	(4)-(6)	may	speak	falsely”	(18).	We	think	this	caution	(“may	speak	truly”)	is	appropriate.	If	you	were	to	press	Lewis,	Walton,	and	Taylor	with	the	question,	“What	is	the	content	of	I1?”,	you	would	get	very	different	responses,	along	the	following	lines:			 Lewis	would	say:	“I1	has	the	content	that	HG1	is	true.”		 Walton	would	say:	“I1	has	the	content	that	HG1	is	fictional.”		 Taylor	would	say:	“I1	has	the	content	that	HG1	is	pragmatically	appropriate.”		What	causes	this	divergence?	We	have	a	simple	explanation.	I1	has	no	propositional	content,	so	if	theorists	were	confronted	with	saying	what	its	content	was,	they	would	be	forced	to	make	something	up,	which	they	would	do	partly	by	consulting	background	beliefs.	I1	conveys	the	sense	of	something’s	being	right	about	HG1,	but	what	exactly	that	is	must	be	worked	out	by	interpretation	(what’s	causing	it	to	feel	right?)	in	consultation	with	one’s	evolving	set	of	background	beliefs.			 To	return	to	the	main	thread	of	this	essay,	thought-experimental	intuitions	appear	to	have	relatives	in	fictional-discourse	intuitions:	both	kinds	of	intuition	are	spontaneous,	conscious,	non-theoretical,	and	non-propositional.	Is	this	coincidence	a	coincidence?	We	think	not.	Thought	experiments,	in	the	end,	are	miniature	fictions.	So	thought-experimental	intuitions	should	have	the	same	characteristics	as	intuitions	about	fiction	generally.	Gettier’s	case	about	Smith	is	purely	fictional.	There	is	no	Smith;	correspondingly,	there	is	no	man	with	such	a	belief	about	ten	coins.	Now	take	the	fictional	sentence:	“Smith’s	belief	about	ten	coins	is	true.”	One	intuits	that	there	is	something	right	about	this	sentence,	but	it	is	hard	to	make	out	exactly																																																									17	Taylor	focuses	on	cases	that	mix	fictional	names	with	claims	about	reality,	such	as	“Santa	Claus	does	not	exist”	or	“Santa	Claus	isn’t	coming	tonight.”	But	much	of	what	he	says	about	such	mixed	sentences	can	carry	over	to	purely	fictional	sentences	as	well.	
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what	the	supposed	content	of	this	intuition	should	even	be,	given	that	there	is	no	Smith	and	no	actual	belief.	Your	intuition	pushes	you	to	try	to	make	sense	of	the	sentence,	but	it	cannot	be	more	specific	than	that.		
	 Let’s	return	now	to	the	objection	to	our	thinking	that	we	discussed	at	the	end	of	the	last	section	(3.2).	That	objection	attempted	to	make	sense	of	the	data	that	motivate	us	by	saying	that	the	content	of	Gettier	intuition	just	is	that	x’s	belief	is	not	
knowledge	(where	x	is	the	Gettiered	agent).	Our	response	(iii)	to	this	is	as	follows:	since,	for	any	Gettiered	x,	x	is	a	non-existent	fictional	character,	it	is	entirely	unclear	
exactly	what	the	mooted	proposition	is	even	supposed	to	be.18	That	lack	of	clarity	is	made	palpable	by	the	divergences	between	Lewis,	Walton,	and	Taylor	on	the	semantics	of	sentences	with	fictional	names.	And	if	it’s	not	clear	what	the	proposition	is	supposed	to	be,	it’s	unlikely	that	any	layperson	or	philosopher	has	spontaneous	conscious	access	to	that	mooted	proposition	as	part	of	an	intuition.	But	it	is	an	entailment	of	Mainstream	Propositionalism	that	people	should	have	spontaneous	conscious	access	to	a	proposition;	so	much	the	worse	for	Mainstream	Propositionalism.19			
4	Our	Positive	Proposal:	Interpreting	Intuitions	
	We	asserted	earlier:	many	thought-experimental	intuitions	are	positively	or	
negatively	valenced	spontaneous,	conscious,	non-theoretical	feelings	that	are	directed	at	a	cluster	of	ideas	(broadly	construed)	and	that	motivate	revising	or	maintaining	
beliefs	one	has	about	those	ideas.	Where	might	such	mental	states	come	from?	Much	information	in	our	brains	is	buried	in	stores	of	sub-doxastic	mental	systems.	This	includes	information	about	the	biological	world,	the	physical	world,	contagion,	threats,	people’s	minds	and	social	relations,	language,	and	even—it	seems—the	structure	of	knowledge.20	“Sub-doxastic”	means	that	much	of	this	information,	though	poised	to	guide	various	behaviors	(like	freezing	or	avoiding	in	response	to	threats),	is	not	poised	for	conscious,	verbal	expression.	People	“know”	things	about	biological	kinds	that	they	can’t	consciously	express—for	example,	that	a	single	organism	cannot	belong	to	two	different	kinds	at	the	same	“level”	(no	elm-
																																																								18	This,	by	the	way,	is	why	the	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	(2009)	theory	comes	out	as	complicated	as	it	does.	19	At	the	risk	of	belaboring	the	point,	we	can	put	this	response	into	the	form	of	a	dilemma.	Any	proposition	complex	enough	to	be	identified	with	truth	conditions	for	a	fictional	sentence	would	be	too	complex	to	be	borne	in	mind	spontaneously	and	consciously	(just	look	at	Lewis’	final	analysis!).	So	either	you	accord	the	intuitions	in	question	genuine	propositional	content	or	you	don’t.	If	you	do,	that	content	is	too	complex	to	be	conscious.	If	you	don’t,	you	don’t.	Either	way,	Mainstream	Propositionalism	loses.	As	it	happens,	Ichikawa	and	Jarvis	(2009:	fn.	14)	express	some	reservations	as	to	whether	the	thought-experimental	processes	they	discuss	are	all	conscious,	so	it	seems	they	might	go	with	the	first	horn	of	the	dilemma.	20	[References.]	Folk	biology:	Medin	and	Atran	(1999).	Folk	physics:	McCloskey	(1983);	Baillargeon	(2002);	Proffitt	and	Kaiser	(2006).	Contagion	system:	Rozin	et	al.	(1986);	Springer	and	Belk	(1994).	
Fear	and	threats:	LeDoux	(1996).	Mindreading	/	folk	psychology:	Baron-Cohen	(1995);	Flavell	(1999);	Nichols	and	Stich	(2003);	Goldman	(2006).	Language:	Chomsky	(1965,	1986,	1995);	Pinker	(1994).	
Core	folk	epistemology:	Machery	et	al.	(2015).	
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beeches).21	People	often	don’t	even	realize	that	they	have	such	sub-doxastic	information,	since	much	of	it	guides	inference	and	behavior	without	ever	being	coded	as	explicit	conscious	principles.	We	propose	that	the	core	folk	epistemology	identified	by	Machery	et	al.	(2015)	is	also	a	largely	sub-doxastic	information	store,	as	are	many	of	the	information	stores	probed	by	philosophical	thought	experiments,	which	are,	as	Dennett	(2013)	aptly	puts	it,	“intuition	pumps.”		 It	is	useful	that	not	all	information	in	the	brain	is	conscious;	if	it	were	otherwise,	consciousness	would	be	swamped	and	unable	to	support	decision-making.	But	the	downside	of	this	mostly	useful	arrangement	is	that	it’s	difficult	to	make	sub-doxastic	information	conscious	and	explicit.	The	information	humans	have	about	object	statics,	for	example,	enables	us	to	stack	things	(Povinelli	2000,	Baillargeon	2002);	it’s	not	there	to	help	us	verbalize	axioms	of	object	statics.	Your	sub-doxastic	fear	system	(another	example)	may	tell	your	consciousness	that	something	is	a	threat—you	feel	a	fright	at	it—without	revealing	the	information	it	uses	to	categorize	something	as	a	threat.	The	path	from	the	sub-doxastic	storage	up	to	conscious	verbal	formulation	is	rocky.		 We	have,	however,	a	cognitive	tool	for	digging	information	out.	We	can	voluntarily	imagine	situations	and	then	see	whether	our	sub-doxastic	systems	produce	an	error	or	no-error	signal	of	some	sort—or	any	other	reaction.	Sub-doxastic	systems	produce	fast	reactions	to	events	in	the	world.		But	we	can	also	imagine	events	in	order	to	get	similar	kinds	of	reaction.	Since	the	world	to	which	sub-doxastic	systems	react	largely	arrives	in	a	sensory	way,	imaginings,	which	often	have	sensory	constituents	(mental	imagery),	can	help	get	those	reactions.	These	reactions	are	imagination-induced	intuitions.	What	is	imagined	can	be	chosen	voluntarily,	but	the	intuition	the	imagining	induces	is	not	subject	voluntary	control	and	is	often	not	even	anticipated	(that’s	often	the	point):	it’s	spontaneous.	And	the	intuition	is	non-theoretical	in	that,	instead	of	conforming	to	antecedent	conscious	thought,	it	conforms	to	sub-doxastic	information.	Finally,	though	the	intuition	is	conscious,	though	the	sub-doxastic	information	generating	it	is	not.			 Our	goal	is	to	apply	this	framework	to	thought-experimental	intuitions.	But	first,	let’s	again	observe	a	similar	process	in	the	linguistic	case,	just	to	have	a	parallel	example.		Suppose	we	consciously	endorsed	a	grammatical	rule	that	a	grade	school	teacher	might	have	taught	us:	“nouns	are	pluralized	whenever	they	refer	to	numerically	more	than	one	object,	but	not	otherwise.”	But	now	imagine	the	following	(ungrammatical)	strings	of	words:		 *He	ate	zero	piece	of	cake.	*On	her	plate	was	0.5	piece	of	cake.	*They	shared	1.0	piece	of	cake.			
																																																								21	This	is	a	cross-culturally	shared	“axiom”	of	folk	biology	(Atran	et	al.	1997).	We	put	“know”	here	in	scare	quotes	to	refer	to	implicit	awareness	of	information	that	helps	guide	behavior,	even	if	that	awareness	doesn’t	rise	to	the	level	of	knowledge	in	a	strict	sense.	
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All	three	strings	comport	with	the	conscious	principle	just	mentioned,	since	“piece”	in	no	case	refers	to	numerically	more	than	one.	But	they	all	elicit	an	error	signal	from	the	sub-doxastic	language	system,	since	the	more	fundamental	sub-doxastic	rules	of	language	(Chomsky’s	1986	“I-Language”)	differ	from	the	consciously	endorsed	ones.	This	error	signal	is	an	intuition:	spontaneous,	conscious,	and	non-theoretical	(in	the	sense	that	it	isn’t	governed	by	one’s	consciously	endorsed	grammar).	Conscious	thought	sends	the	imagined	examples	down	to	the	sub-doxastic	system,	which	processes	them	unconsciously	and	then	belches	up	an	intuition	to	consciousness.	Systematizing	such	intuitions	as	evidence	for	a	theory	of	the	“language	acquisition	device”	is	the	grand	project	Chomsky	(1957,	1965)	initiated.			 	When	a	sub-doxastic	system	produces	an	error	signal	(or	other	signal),	one	is	often	at	a	loss	as	to	which	element	of	one’s	imagined	example	caused	that	error	signal	(or	other	signal).22	Sometimes	it’s	obvious,	as	when	I	imagine	a	stone	falling	upward.	But	sometimes	it’s	not	at	all	obvious,	as	in	the	Gettier	cases.	Either	way,	one	must	consciously	interpret	the	error	or	no-error	signal	in	light	of	other	beliefs	in	order	to	understand	its	significance	for	the	imagined	example.	Other	beliefs	about	the	imagined	situation	often	give	guidance	as	to	the	source	of	the	error.	But	different	belief	sets	will	assign	different	meanings	to	error	or	no-error	signals	of	the	same	type,	as	we	saw	with	differing	interpretations	of	sentences	with	fictional	names.			 Turning	now	explicitly	to	philosophical	thought	experiments,	we	arrive	at	the	following	view.	The	original	Gettier	intuition	is	elicited	by	imagining	the	Smith	“10	coins”	example,	along	with	imagining	applying	the	term	“knowledge”	to	Smith’s	belief,	and	then	sending	that	combined	imagined	case	down	to	one’s	sub-doxastic	conception	of	knowledge	/	core	folk	epistemology.	The	intuition	in	response	to	the	Gettier	case	is	the	error	signal	that	the	sub-doxastic	system	spontaneously	belches	up.	(We	think	this	same	process,	mutatis	mutandis,	will	turn	out	to	be	characteristic	of	much	philosophical	thought	experimentation.)		 It	is	up	to	one’s	subsequent	interpretation	to	make	sense	of	this	error	signal	(or	whatever	the	response	is)	and	formulate	a	judgment.	One	might	judge	that	justified	true	belief	isn’t	sufficient	for	knowledge.	Or	one	might	judge	that	Smith’s	belief	wasn’t	really	justified.	Different	background	beliefs	(or	different	levels	of	empathy)	yield	different	interpretations	of	the	same	error	signal/intuition.			 We	sketch	the	mental	processing	of	Gettier’s	thought	experiment	below,	where	the	dashed	line	represents	the	muddy	boundary	between	conscious	and	unconscious	processing	and	where	arrows	trace	the	order	of	processing:		
																																																								22	We	focus	here	mainly	on	error	signals	mostly	for	reasons	of	space	and	because	those	seem	to	include	the	intuitions	prompted	by	Gettier	cases,	which	are	our	running	examples.	We	think,	however,	that	the	broad	structure	of	our	account	could	apply	to	many	“positive”	intuitions	as	well.		
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		 	 										Conscious	thought,	which	first	considers	the	case,	begins	in	the	dark	about	what	is	or	isn’t	“intuitively”	problematic	about	it;	the	detailed	processing	first	happens	in	sub-doxastic	systems;	consciousness	then	ponders	significant	features	of	the	thought	experimental	case	to	which	the	intuition	is	a	response.	If	all	goes	well,	it	comes	up	with	a	reasonable	interpretation	of	the	case,	in	light	of	the	intuitive	response.23		 How	does	the	information	in	sub-doxastic	systems	get	there?	The	answer	is	various.	Some	information	in	sub-doxastic	systems	may	be	innate	(this	is	Chomsky’s	view	of	the	language	organ);	other	information	may	be	what	McCauley	(2011)	calls	“maturationally	natural”	(it	occurs	as	a	reliable	product	of	a	maturing	person’s	interaction	with	normal	environmental	inputs);	and	some	might	be	acquired	from	experiences	that	manage	to	influence	how	low-level	processes	work.	This	last	possibility	is	easily	overlooked:	the	fact	that	some	information	is	acquired	through	experience/learning	does	not	entail	that	it	is	conscious	or	easily	revisable.	As	Ernst	Mach	writes:		 Everything	which	we	observe	imprints	itself	uncomprehended	and	unanalyzed	on	our	percepts	and	ideas,	which	then,	in	their	turn,	mimic	the	process	of	nature	in	their	most	general	and	striking	features.	In	these	accumulated	experiences	we	posses	a	treasure-store,	which	is	ever	close	at	hand,	and	of	which	only	the	smallest	portion	is	embodied	in	clear	articulate	thought.	The	circumstance	that	it	is	easier	to	resort	to	these	experiences	than	it	is	to	nature	herself,	and	that	they	are,	notwithstanding	this,	free,	in	the	sense	indicated,	from	subjectivity,	invests	them	with	high	value.	(1883/1960:	36)																																																									23	This	process	may	of	course	be	iterative,	with	repeated	cycles	of	slightly	varied	examples	being	sent	down	to	the	sub-doxastic	systems.	Dennett	(2013)	calls	this	“turning	the	knobs.”	
SUB-DOXASTIC	SYSTEM	WITH	INFORMATION	ABOUT	
KNOWLEDGE	/	CORE	FOLK	EPISTEMOLOGY		
Imagined	details	of	Gettier	case	
Imagined	application	of	“knowledge”	to	the	case	
	
INTUITION	
Belief-based	interpreting	of	INTUITION	 Propositional	judgment	(e.g.,	some	cases	
of	JTB	aren’t	
knowledge)	
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	Gendler	(1998:	415)	interprets	this	passage	as	saying	that	much	of	the	valuable	and	reliable	information	we	have	is	in	our	minds	“not	organized	under	any	theoretical	framework.”	We	endorse	Gendler’s	interpretation	and	note	that	it	fits	well	with	the	aims	of	this	paper.	Intuitions	issue	from	the	non-theoretical	“treasure-store”	of	sub-doxastic	information,	when	that	store	is	prompted	by	imaginings,	including	thought	experiments.		 In	sum,	intuitions	are	spontaneous,	conscious	products	of	sub-doxastic,	non-theoretical	systems,	which	can	be	elicited	by	way	of	imagining.	This	appears	to	be	so	for	intuitions	in	response	to	many	sorts	of	imagined	situation,	including	especially	those	portrayed	in	philosophical	thought	experiments.	How	does	the	conscious	interpretation	of	intuitions	work?		 There	is	no	single	answer	to	this	question,	since	interpretation	is	holistic.	But	let’s	sketch	how	it	goes	sometimes.	When	one	has	an	intuition,	one	forms	a	belief	that	one	had	an	experience	with	a	certain	phenomenology.	Call	this	the	experience	belief.	One	then	forms	linking	beliefs	that	link	the	experience	belief,	which	is	about	the	intuition,	to	the	body	of	theoretical	beliefs	under	consideration.	A	linking	belief	could	be:	“If	theoretical	propositions	p1,	.	.	.	,	pn	were	true,	then	the	thought	experimental	case	wouldn’t	have	prompted	the	negative	intuition	it	did.”	This	linking	belief,	in	conjunction	with	the	experience	belief,	prompts	one	to	reject	at	least	one	of	the	theoretical	propositions	p1,	.	.	.	,	pn.	But	which	one?	Here	one	must	use	other	beliefs	to	help	figure	out	which	of	p1,	.	.	.	,	pn		is	most	worth	rejecting.	One	might	then	judge	that	p3	is	false.	If	one	does,	one	might	carelessly	say,	“I	have	an	intuition	that	p3	is	false.”	But	this	talk,	though	tempting,	conflates	the	intuition	with	the	follow-on	judgment.	We	should	not	attribute	p3	to	the	intuition	because	(i)	the	denial	of	p3	is	a	theoretical	belief	that	has	its	significance	partly	in	virtue	of	other	surrounding	theoretical	beliefs	and	(ii)	one	may	just	as	well	have	come	to	reject	p2	or	p4	instead	of	p3	in	light	of	the	intuition	and	experience	belief,	if	one	had	had	somewhat	different	background	beliefs.24	So	linking	the	intuition	specifically	to	denial	that	p3	is	true,	even	if	that’s	the	judgment	one	comes	to	have,	is	a	mistake.			 This	concludes	our	positive	theory	of	interpreting	intuitions,	which,	once	grasped,	is	fairly	simple.	For	convenience,	we	restate	its	basic	components	here:		 1. Thought	experiments	are	represented	in	conscious	imaginative	acts.	2. Those	imaginative	acts	trigger	further	processing	in	sub-doxastic	systems.	3. As	a	result	of	that	processing,	which	is	unconscious,	the	sub-doxastic	systems	bring	about	an	intuition	in	consciousness.	4. That	intuition	is	non-propositional,	though	it	often	has	a	positive	or	negative	valence.	5. Conscious	thought	interprets	the	intuition	in	light	of	other	beliefs	in	a	way	that	yields	a	propositional	judgment.25																																																									24	Here	the	spectre	of	the	Quine-Duhem	problem	hovers	over	the	interpretation	of	thought-experimental	intuitions.	25	Points	4.	and	5.	here	correspond	to	the	two	“stages”	of	intuition	and	judgment	mentioned	in	the	introduction.	
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	We	think	this	account	covers	a	wide	range	of	thought-experimental	intuitions,	though	perhaps	not	all.	It	is	an	empirical	question	in	the	end	how	far	the	account	extends.	Interpretationalism	has	the	virtue	of	comporting	well	with	both	phenomenology	and	psychology,	and	it	preserves	most	of	what	we	want	to	say	about	the	psychology	of	intuitions:	they	are	spontaneous,	conscious,	and	non-theoretical.	Our	only	major	revision	to	the	psychological	picture	of	intuitions	is	in	giving	up	propositionality.				
5	Conclusion:	The	Use	of	Intuition	in	Philosophy	
	 	We	have	given	reasons	for	thinking	that	many	thought-experimental	intuitions,	including	especially	the	ever-fascinating	Gettier	intuition,	do	not	have	consciously-accessible	propositional	contents.	Mainstream	Propositionalism	is	false.	The	phenomenology	of	having	intuitions	in	response	to	important	thought	experiments	does	not	comport	with	that	view.	The	view	also	stumbles	at	addressing	the	puzzle	of	why	people	with	the	same	intuition	type	say	strikingly	different	things	in	expressing	their	intuition	tokens.	And	the	psychology	of	related	intuitions	about	fictional	sentences	appears	not	to	be	propositional	either.		A	better	view	is	on	offer:	Interpretationalism.	This	view	avoids	the	problems	of	Mainstream	Propositionalism	and	sits	well	with	contemporary	cognitive	science.	On	this	view,	thought-experimental	intuitions	are	conscious	states	that	occur	in	relation	to	imagined	examples	and	philosophical	positions	that	pertain	to	those	examples;	such	intuitions	are	non-propositional,	so	their	philosophical	significance	in	propositional	terms	needs	to	be	worked	out	through	a	process	of	interpretation	in	conjunction	with	background	beliefs.	One	cannot	simply	“read	off”	propositional	content	from	a	thought-experimental	intuition.	The	appearance	to	the	contrary	is	largely	the	product	(i)	of	confusing	the	intuition	with	follow-on	propositional	judgments	(which	may	occur	in	quick	succession)26	and	(ii)	of	wishful	thinking.		 What	wishful	thinking	do	we	mean?	Doing	philosophy	would	be	a	neater,	more	straightforward	process	if	our	thought-experimental	intuitions	had	clear,	conscious	propositional	contents.	Propositions	would	be	convenient	places	to	begin	theorizing,	even	if	we	treated	them	as	defeasible.	Propositions,	on	many	construals,	are	structured	in	a	way	that	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	logical	derivation,	a	process	at	which	most	philosophers	have	some	skill.	We	thus	suspect,	though	few	would	openly	endorse	it,	that	many	philosophers	are	still	quietly	tempted	by	the	lull	of	an	image	of	philosophy	in	which	intuited	propositions	plus	logical	inference	forms	straightforwardly	justify	philosophical	theories.	But	that’s	just	not	how	it	works.	Rather,	intuitions	cast	shade	or	sunlight	over	certain	regions	of	intellectual	space,																																																									26	One	more	point	on	terminology:	even	if	Mainstream	Propositionalists	wanted	to	stipulate	that	they	use	the	word	“intuition”	to	refer	to	judgments,	they	would	still	need	a	word	for	the	things	we	call	intuition,	which	are	non-propositional	and	no	doubt	exist;	also,	they	would	have	to	give	up	the	non-theoreticality	of	intuition,	which	is	supposed	to	be	its	chief	epistemic	virtue,	since	the	judgments	that	issue	from	thought	experiments	are	theoretically	loaded.		
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inviting	us	to	look	further.	The	resulting	philosophical	work	we	must	do	is	far	more	difficult	than	the	Mainstream	Propositionalist	picture	would	have	us	think.	But	it	is	also,	in	the	end,	much	more	creative	and	rewarding.			
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